In Film and Phenomenology, Allan Casebier develops a theory of representation first indicated in the writings of the father of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, and then applies it to the case of cinematic representation. This work provides one of the clearest expositions of Husserl's highly influential but often obscure thought. It also demonstrates the power of phenomenology to illuminate the experience of the art form unique to the twentieth-century cinema. Film and Phenomenology is intended as an antidote to all (...) hitherto existing theories about the nature of cinematic representation, whether issuing from classic sources such as the film theory of Andre Bazin or the post-structuralist synthesis of Lacanian psychoanalysis, Barthesian textual analysis and Metzean cine-semiotics. Casebier shows how a phenomenological account of representation will further the aims of any film theory. Developing a viable feminist film theory, legitimizing the documentary, answering the challenge of Derridean deconstruction, properly theorizing narrativity, Film and Phenomenology argues that theory of film must be Realist both with respect to epistemology and ontological issues. In this way, this work runs contrary to the whole course of contemporary film theory which has been deeply anti-Realist. (shrink)

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick Ferré. These essays, informed by the insights of Ferré and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

Many believe that the ethical problems of donation after cardiocirculatory death (DCD) have been "worked out" and that it is unclear why DCD should be resisted. In this paper we will argue that DCD donors may not yet be dead, and therefore that organ donation during DCD may violate the dead donor rule. We first present a description of the process of DCD and the standard ethical rationale for the practice. We then present our concerns with DCD, including the following: (...) irreversibility of absent circulation has not occurred and the many attempts to claim it has have all failed; conflicts of interest at all steps in the DCD process, including the decision to withdraw life support before DCD, are simply unavoidable; potentially harmful premortem interventions to preserve organ utility are not justifiable, even with the help of the principle of double effect; claims that DCD conforms with the intent of the law and current accepted medical standards are misleading and inaccurate; and consensus statements by respected medical groups do not change these arguments due to their low quality including being plagued by conflict of interest. Moreover, some arguments in favor of DCD, while likely true, are "straw-man arguments," such as the great benefit of organ donation. The truth is that honesty and trustworthiness require that we face these problems instead of avoiding them. We believe that DCD is not ethically allowable because it abandons the dead donor rule, has unavoidable conflicts of interests, and implements premortem interventions which can hasten death. These important points have not been, but need to be fully disclosed to the public and incorporated into fully informed consent. These are tall orders, and require open public debate. Until this debate occurs, we call for a moratorium on the practice of DCD. (shrink)

What is history? From Thucydides to Toynbee historians and nonhistorians alike have wondered how to answer this question. A New Philosophy of History reflects on developments over the last two decades in historical writing, not least the renewed interest in the status of narrative itself and the presence of the authorial "voice." Subjects include the problems of Grand Narrative, multiple voices and the personal presence of the historian in his text, the ambitions of the French Annales school and the so-called (...) "Grand Chronicler," and the relevance of non-literary models--museum presentations and picturings--regarding historical discourse. The range of approaches found in A New Philosophy of History ensures that this book will establish itself as required reading not only for historians, but for everyone interested in literary theory, philosophy, or cultural studies. This volume presents essays by Hans Kellner, Nancy F. Partner, Richard T. Vann, Arthur C. Danto, Linda Orr, Philippe Carrard, Ann Rigney, Allan Megill, Robert Berkhofer, Stephen Bann, and Frank Ankersmit. (shrink)

The article considers some problems with the pairing of joking and disability, and then questions whether the world of the ill is pseudotheological, as Stronach and Allan quote Kundera saying it is. Aspects of Kundera's argument that Stronach and Allan omit suggest a more complex relation between disability, the body and the presence of the person in the multiple texts that end up being involved: Stronach and Allan's text, autobiographical texts such as Robert Murphy's, and the text (...) of several jokes, including one of my own which frames the article. (shrink)

With this book Allan Wolter makes available the essential writings of Duns Scotus on the will and morality. The book fills a major lacuna in medieval and Scotistic studies. In making the book Wolter tells us that his primary purpose was twofold. First of all, he wished to "correct common misconceptions that arose because of [Scotus's] voluntarist notion of God's relationship to creatures". The means he chose toward this therapeutic end in the history of philosophy is simply a matter (...) of putting forth an accurate and complete report of Scotus's teaching. The second purpose was "to show the unity of [Scotus's] ethical system based on right reason". Measured by these criteria, I would judge the book to be remarkably successful. Duns Scotus on Will and Morality gives a complete view of Scotus's ethical system. The selections are made carefully and generously so that the reader can appreciate the fullness of Scotistic moral teachings. (shrink)

The thymus gland, which plays a key role in the maturation and functioning of the lymphoid system, is implicated in the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). The observation that the thymic hormone, thymosin α1, is elevated in individuals at risk for AIDS (as opposed to being depressed in other immunodeficient states) has provided the first direct evidence that the thymus is malfunctioning early in the course of this deadly disease. These observations have been valuable in screening for the syndrome with (...) a rapid radioimmunoassay and in the initiation of the first clinical trials with thymosin in high risk homosexuals and hemophiliacs. If the progressive immune paralysis in AIDS is due to a dying thymus, the early identification of asymptomatic carriers of AIDS or individuals with modest AIDS‐related dysfunction may lead to therapy with thymosin or other thymomimetic agents that can restore immune function and prevent the onset of frank AIDS. (shrink)

With this book Allan Wolter makes available the essential writings of Duns Scotus on the will and morality. The book fills a major lacuna in medieval and Scotistic studies. In making the book Wolter tells us that his primary purpose was twofold. First of all, he wished to "correct common misconceptions that arose because of [Scotus's] voluntarist notion of God's relationship to creatures". The means he chose toward this therapeutic end in the history of philosophy is simply a matter (...) of putting forth an accurate and complete report of Scotus's teaching. The second purpose was "to show the unity of [Scotus's] ethical system based on right reason". Measured by these criteria, I would judge the book to be remarkably successful. Duns Scotus on Will and Morality gives a complete view of Scotus's ethical system. The selections are made carefully and generously so that the reader can appreciate the fullness of Scotistic moral teachings. (shrink)

Review of Allan B. Wolter and Daniel A. Frank, Duns Scotus: Metaphysician.

on Film and Phenomenology by Allan Casebier.

ArgumentNeuroscience research has created multiple versions of the human brain. The “social brain” is one version and it is the subject of this paper. Most image-based research in the field of social neuroscience is task-driven: the brain is asked to respond to a cognitive (perceptual) stimulus. The tasks are derived from theories, operational models, and back-stories now circulating in social neuroscience. The social brain comes with a distinctive back-story, an evolutionary history organized around three, interconnected themes: mind-reading, empathy, and the (...) emergence of self-consciousness. This paper focuses on how empathy has been incorporated into the social brain and redefined via parallel research streams, employing a shared, imaging technology. The concluding section describes how these developments can be understood as signaling the emergence of a new version of human nature and the unconscious. My argument is not that empathy in the social brain is a myth, but rather that it is served by a myth consonant with the canons of science. (shrink)

author. University Professor in the School of Law, Columbia University. (From July 2006, Professor of Law, New York University.) Earlier versions of this Essay were presented at the Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy at University College London, at a law faculty workshop at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and at a constitutional law conference at Harvard Law School. I am particularly grateful to Ronald Dworkin, Ruth Gavison, and Seana Shiffrin for their formal comments on those occasions and also to (...) James Allan, Aharon Barak, Richard Bellamy, Aileen Cavanagh, Arthur Chaskalson, Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Charles Fried, Andrew Geddis, Stephen Guest, Ian Haney-Lopez, Alon Harel, David Heyd, Sam Issacharoff, Elena Kagan, Kenneth Keith, Michael Klarman, John Manning, Andrei Marmor, Frank Michelman, Henry Monaghan, Véronique Munoz-Dardé, John Morley, Matthew Palmer, Richard Pildes, Joseph Raz, Carol Sanger, David Wiggins, and Jo Wolff for their suggestions and criticisms. Hundreds of others have argued with me about this issue over the years: This Essay is dedicated to all of them, collegially and with thanks. (shrink)

Philosophers often hold that the aim of conceptual analysis is to discover the representational content of a given concept such as freewill, belief, or law. In From Metaphysics to Ethics and other recent work, Frank Jackson has developed a theory of conceptual analysis that is one of the most advanced systematizations of this widespread idea. I argue that this influential way of characterizing conceptual analysis is too narrow. I argue that it is possible that an expressivist account could turn (...) out to be correct as a genuine conceptual analysis of a genuine concept. I claim that since an expressivist analysis does not aim to discover the representational content of a given concept—and, indeed, might itself be based on the idea that the concept in question is not even representational in nature—the possibility of expressivist conceptual analysis shows that Jackson’s theory of conceptual analysis is incomplete as it currently stands. I conclude that Jackson needs to either shift his basic understanding of the nature of conceptual analysis or commit to a particular normative reinterpretation of his project. (shrink)